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Abstract
The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) market has motivated widespread prolifera-
tion of microcontroller- (MCU) based embedded systems. Suitable due to their abundance,
low cost, low power consumption and small footprint. The memory architecture typically
consists of volatile memory such as block(s) of SRAM, and non-volatile memory (NVM)
for code storage. Authentication and encryption safeguard these endpoints within an IoT
framework, which requires storage of a secure key. Keys stored within integrated circuits
(ICs) are susceptible to attack via reverse engineering of the NVM. Newer approaches use
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which produce unique identiﬁers that takes advan-
tage of device-level randomness induced by manufacturing process variation in silicon.
The unclonable property of PUFs is demonstrated with an analytical model. The un-
predictable yet repeatable start-up values (SUVs) of SRAM bit-cells form the basis of an
SRAM PUF. Performance measures, such as reliability, randomness, symmetry, and stabil-
ity, dictate the quality of a PUF. Two commercial oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) ARM-Cortex based
MCU products, the STM32F429ZIT6U and ATSAMR21G18A, underwent automated and
manual power cycling experiments that examined their embedded SRAM SUVs. The
characterization framework provided acquires data via debug software and a developed C
program, power cycling using a USB controlled relay and post-processing using Python.
Applications of PUFs include cryptographic key generation, device identiﬁcation and true
random number hardware generation.
Statistical results and a comparative analysis are presented. Amongst the total bit-
cell count of the embedded SRAM in STM and ATSAM MCUs, 36.86% and 28.86% are
classiﬁed as non- or partially-skewed, respectively across N = 10, 000 samples. The Atmel
MCU outperforms the STM MCU in reliability by 1.42 %, randomness by 0.65 % and
stability by 8.00 %, with a 4.74 % SUV bias towards a logic '1'. Max errors per 128-bit
data item is 22 and 38 bits for MCU #1 and MCU #2, respectively. The STM MCU
exhibits column-wise correlation illustrated in a heatmap, where the Atmel MCU shows a
random signature. The embedded SRAM in the Atmel MCU outperforms the STM MCU's
and is thereby considered the more suitable PUF.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) aims to integrate physical objects with real time computer
systems connected to the Internet. This technology is made possible from broadband Inter-
net availability, ingenuity in embedded systems equipped with microcontrollers (MCUs),
and the ongoing reduction in semiconductor costs. American market research ﬁrm Gart-
ner estimates that the IoT market currently consists of 1.6 billion devices [1]. Networking
company Cisco projects this will grow to over 50 billion connected devices by 2020. [2].
1.1 Motivation
With an ever growing number of connected physical, trustworthy machine-machine com-
munication becomes increasingly vital, and eﬀective device authentication protocols are
necessary to prevent counterfeiting [3]. These interactions bring forth a wide range of
challenges including interoperability, scalability, and trustworthy communication. Encryp-
tion with a secret key is necessary for secure data transmission over public channels [4].
Secret keys stored on non-volatile memories (NVM) are susceptible to malicious reverse
engineering attacks. Adversaries can exploit algorithm timing and power consumption in
side channel attacks.
A promising alternative is to generate a secret key without the need to store it. In
1
digital integrated circuits (ICs), a physical unclonable function (PUF) is the source for
generating volatile, chip-speciﬁc signatures at runtime or power-on [3]. In the past decade,
research indicates that PUFs may be a hopeful solution for the aforementioned security
issues. The premise of this work is a study of the suitability of PUFs implemented in
existing commercial oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) products.
A PUF is an expression of an unclonable instance-speciﬁc feature of a physical object,
analogous to biometric features of humans, such as ﬁngerprints [3]. Applications of PUFs
include key generation, device identiﬁcation and true random number hardware generation
(TRNG) [4]. There are various implementations of PUFs, including those based on IC
coatings, ﬂip-ﬂops, latches, optical techniques, and numerous other methods [4]. Silicon
PUFs, the focus of this research, use the transistor mismatches due to manufacturing
process variabilities to produce a unique signature. In an SRAM-based PUF, the bit-cell
start-up-values (SUVs) upon power-on form the basis of a PUF.
Embedded systems equipped with MCUs are in abundance and suitable for the IoT
market due to their low cost, low power consumption and small footprint. The memory
architecture in these systems typically consists of volatile memory such as small block(s)
of SRAM, and some NVM for code storage. Prior to utilizing the SUVs of the SRAM bit-
cells to construct PUFs, one undergoes a qualiﬁcation process to determine its suitability.
In this work, the analysis of embedded SRAM in COTS products − ARM Cortex based
MCUs are presented in accordance to their PUF performance with regards to reliability,
randomness, symmetry and stability.
In addition to existing embedded SRAM characterization work for COTS MCUs in [5]
and [6], this thesis contributes a new set of reference data. Using the birthday problem [7],
a combinatorial analytical model for SRAM- based PUFs is presented. Lastly, this thesis
provides a PUF characterization framework for SRAMs. whether external or within a
system on chip (SoC) such as a MCU.
2
1.2 Physical Unclonable Functions
A PUF is that it is a physical one-way function in which an input produces an output,
whereas the input cannot be determined given the output. The concept of a PUF origi-
nated when Pappu observed unique speckle patterns on a transparent epoxy wafer ﬁlled
with bubbles upon shining it with a laser [8]. Gassend et al. [9] introduced silicon-based
PUFs. In this class of PUFs, process variation during fabrication leads to local device pa-
rameter varations used to generate chip-speciﬁc unique IDs. The unclonable property stems
from this phenomenon, since the manufacturing process is stochastic in nature, resulting
in random unpredictable process variations. Hardware security solutions using PUF tech-
nology are applied in IoT, embedded systems, identiﬁcation, automotive, communications,
content distribution, government and defense markets [2].
A PUF is a feature of a physical system that reacts to an input stimulus known as a
challenge and generates a single response determined by mismatches in physical properties,
together called a challenge-response pair (CRP). The function mapping is denoted as:
f : Ri ←− PUF(Ci, Si), where:
 Ri = Corresponding output response from the instance i
 Ci = Speciﬁc input stimulus to the instance i
 Si = Collection of all physical parameters for instance i
In Figure 1.1, an example is provided of a silicon-based PUF. The challenge and response
relationship is binary and is described by bit-streams. Examples of challenges include
test vectors for arbiter circuits that exercise critical delay paths, or memory addresses
for SRAMs that store SUVs. A PUF with a substantial set of CRPs is classiﬁed as a
strong PUF, otherwise classiﬁed as a weak PUF. A system with 1 CRP is termed as
a physical obsfuscated key (POK) [3]. Strong PUFs are recommend for high security
systems, limiting attackers with opportunities to decipher patterns due to the vast set of
CRPs. As depicted in Figure 1.2, PUF instances return unique responses when supplied
with identical challenges − the fundamental property of unclonability.
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Figure 1.1: Principle of Silicon-based PUF
Based on the evaluation method, PUF primitives exist as both non-intrinsic and in-
trinsic forms. The coating PUF by Tuyls et al. [10] relies on measuring the capacitance
between two metallic lines on an IC where the top layer is covered by an applied coating
with randomly distributed dielectric particles. In this PUF along with the aforementioned
optical PUF by Pappu et al. [8], the source of randomness in the system is exposed by
additional equipment and hence the PUF is externally evaluated. Other PUFs under this
class exist such as paper, CD, RF DNA, magnetic and accoustical. Intrinsic PUFs on the
other hand rely on the inherent physical characteristics of the system, like silicon-based
PUFs, and are self-evaluated. Delay-based PUFs such as arbiter, glitch and ring oscilla-
tor PUFs generate unique responses based on signal delays between critical paths [3] and
oscillation frequency diﬀerences. Memory-based PUFs such as SRAM, latch, ﬂip-ﬂop and
butterﬂy PUFs generate unique responses based on the probable outcome of a known state
from a metastable state [4]. This thesis focuses on intrinsic or silicon based PUFs with an
emphasis on SRAM-based PUF.
Properties of PUFs:
 Evaluation: The PUF yields a device speciﬁc output response by evaluating an input
challenge. In complexity analysis, the evaluation is within one-degree polynomial
time or O(n), where n refers to the bit-stream length of the challenge input. This
infers using minimal resources with respect to cost, area and power.
 Unclonable: There are no two PUFs with identical CRPs. An analytical model or
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Figure 1.2: PUF Unclonable Property
probabilistic algorithms cannot be derived to predict behaviour.
 Reproducible: Under varied environmental conditions with respect to temperature,
power supply ﬂuctuations and aging, the PUF maintains a reliable set of CRPs.
 Secure: A PUF can only produce an output response given an input challenge. A
PUF cannot provide the corresponding input challenge given an output response.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an analytical model to demonstrate
the unclonable property of a PUF, a literature review on silicon based PUFs with an
5
emphasis on SRAM memories and performance metrics to gauge PUF quality. Chapter
3 proposes a framework to characterize embedded SRAM in COTS MCUs and provides
applications of PUFs. Chapter 4 entails results of empirical data acquired from embedded
SRAM in two ARM-Cortex based MCUs. Chapter 5 concludes this work.
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Chapter 2
Background
To understand this work, this section provides adequate background information including
probability theory, characterization parameters, and SRAM memories.
2.1 Numerical Theory
This section proposes a probabilistic analytical model modelled in software (Python) to
demonstrate a PUF's fundamental property, unclonability or distinctness. A Mathemati-
cian named Richard von Mises introduced the birthday problem [11] which questions how
many students must be present in a classroom such that the probability that two students
sharing the same birthday is 50%. Contrarily, what is the probability of two students
having distinct birthdays? A combinatorial solution was derived with key assumptions:
 Number of birthdays in a year is 365 and they are equally possibly likely or evenly
distributed. Probable outcome of a birth is the same across all students, or 1
365
.
 Anomalies, like leap years or twins are disregarded.
Using the birthday problem, an analytical model for PUFs is described. Referring
to Figure 2.1, what is the probability that two PUF entities do not share the same bit-
stream ﬁngerprint, derived from a silicon based PUF primitve such as SRAM. The number
7
of students is interchanged with the number of PUFs and the number of birthdays is
interchanged with the bit-stream length which gives the total number of possible unique
signatures. This analytical model is demonstrated in two forms: an uniform and non-
uniform distribution. The former of which is extensively covered in this work and the latter
of which is in progress. The purpose of this analytical model is to provide a theoretical
means to provide design insight and understand related PUF concepts.
0 1 1    1 0 0
1 1 0    0 0 1
0 0 1    1 1 0
1 1 1    0 0 0
0 1 0    1 0 1
 
 
 
 
PUF1
PUF2
PUF3
PUFn-1
PUFn
λ  # of bits wide
d = 2λ  # of responses
Challenges
(Addresses)
P(n, d)  Probability of 
two PUFs not sharing 
identical responses
n  # of PUFs
Figure 2.1: PUF Bit-stream Signature Collision Problem
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Uniform Distribution
The distinctness probability P (n, d) of a set of n students with d possible but equally likely
birthdays is expressed in Equation 2.1. The probability that two students share the same
birthday is 50% in a group of n = 23 with d = 365 birthdays [7].
P (n, d) = (
d− 1
d
)(
d− 2
d
) . . . (
d− (n− 1)
d
)
=
(d− 1)(d− 2) . . . [d− (n− 1)]
dn−1
=
d!
dn(d− n)!
(2.1)
In the context of PUFs, the parameters now have the following meanings:
 n→ Total number of silicon-based PUF entities
 d→ Total number of unique signatures = 2λ, where λ bit-stream length
In ﬁgure 2.2, the statistical relationship between PUF entities and bit-stream length
up to λ = 32 is illustrated in log-scale. As the length λ increases, the total space of unique
bit-stream signatures signatures exponentially increases. This allows for increased capacity
of PUF entities in-turn reducing probability of collision.
The following observations can be made:
 For any n > d, P (n, d) = 0 : There are more PUF entities than available bit-stream
responses, hence at least two PUFs share identical responses.
 For n = 1, P (n, d) = 1 : Since there is only PUF entity, no collisions can occur.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of Distinctness − Exact Solution [λ = 32]
As λ grows beyond 64-bits, the exact solution becomes computationally intensive, sig-
niﬁcantly increasing program runtime. Sayraﬁezadeh [7] derived an approximate solution
based on the Taylor series expansion based on natural logithm base e. Equation 2.2 is used
here-on to compute distinctness probabilities for λ = [64, 128, 256]. In ﬁgure 2.3, the solid
line represents the actual solution and the dashed line with triangles represents the approx-
imate solution. Deviations are noticeable for λ = 1, 2 and 4. Quantitatively expressed in
equation 2.3 [12], the deviation error is expresses the absolute diﬀerence between the exact
and approximate solution for a set of n, d parameters. As λ increases, deviation error is
reduced signiﬁcantly. As a sample input set of n = 1x 108 and d = 264, the deviation error
is  ≈ 4.898x10−16. Figure 2.4 illustrates distinctness up to λ = 256 using the approximate
solution, similar trend as the exact solution with less runtime.
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P (n, d) ≈ 1− e−n(n−1)2d
≈ 1− (1− n
2d
)n−1
(2.2)
 ≤ n
3
6(d− n+ 1)2 (2.3)
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Figure 2.3: Probability of Distinctness − Exact vs. Approx Solution [λ = 32]
Table 2.1 summarizes numerical results for varied λ. Results include distinctness prob-
ability in relation to yield P (n, d) with results surpassing a standard of 6σ = 0.999997 [13].
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Figure 2.4: Probability of Distinctness − Taylor Series Approx [λ = 256]
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Table 2.1: Summary − PUF Approximate Solution [Uniform Distribution]
Number of
Signatures (2λ)
Collision Rate
Distinctness
P (n, d)
PUF Entities
65536
λ = 16
1.0e−3 0.999 10
1.0e−4 0.9999 4
1.0e−5 0.99999 1
1.0e−6 0.999999 1
1.0e−7 0.9999999 1
4294967296
λ = 32
1.0e−3 0.999 2000
1.0e−4 0.9999 900
1.0e−5 0.99999 200
1.0e−6 0.999999 90
1.0e−7 0.9999999 20
1.8446744e+19
λ = 64
1.0e−3 0.999 1.0e+8
1.0e−4 0.9999 6.0e+7
1.0e−5 0.99999 1.0e+7
1.0e−6 0.999999 6.0e+6
1.0e−7 0.9999999 1.0e+6
3.4028237e+38
λ = 128
1.0e−3 0.999 8.0e+17
1.0e−4 0.9999 2.0e+17
1.0e−5 0.99999 8.0e+16
1.0e−6 0.999999 2.0e+16
1.0e−7 0.9999999 8.0e+15
1.1579209e+77
λ = 256
1.0e−3 0.999 1.0e+21
1.0e−4 0.9999 1.0e+21
1.0e−5 0.99999 1.0e+21
1.0e−6 0.999999 1.0e+21
1.0e−7 0.9999999 1.0e+21
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Non-uniform Distribution
In the work presented by Berresford [14], the birthday problem takes into consideration
of an empirical data set of 239, 762 births in New York in 1977. The probability of births
is non-uniformly distributed, birthdays are not equally probable. This results in a larger
collision rate.
In the context of PUFs, bit-stream signatures are not always equally probable for a
given λ. Individual bits in the bit-stream do not have a presumed probable outcome of
p = 0.5 upon power-on. The bit-cell is termed skewed, covered at the end of this chapter.
A particular bit-cell may tend to a logic '0' more often than '1' implying that for this given
PUF, creating instances of it will produce signatures that comprise of more logic '0' than
logic '1' resulting in increased collisions.
Consider the case of λ = 2, a total of 4 possible bit-stream responses, [00, 01, 10, 11] as
enlisted in Table 2.2. If each bit-cell has a probable outcome of p = 0.5, each signature
amongst the set of all signatures is equally probable with P = (0.5)∗(0.5) = 0.25. Presum-
ing that we have a PUF where p = 0.6, implying that the bit-cell is slightly skewed towards
a logic '1', and given that all PUF instances have a similar non-uniform distribution, the
probable outcome of a signature 01 is P = (1− 0.6) ∗ (0.6) = 0.24.
Table 2.2: Probable Outcomes of Signatures [λ = 2]
pU = 0.5 and pNU = 0.6
p1 p0 PUniform PNon−uniform
0 0 0.25 = (0.5)2 0.16 = (1− 0.6)2
0 1 0.25 = (0.5)2 0.24 = (1− 0.6) ∗ (0.6)
1 0 0.25 = (0.5)2 0.24 = (0.6) ∗ (1− 0.6)
1 1 0.25 = (0.5)2 0.36 = (0.6)2
A bit-stream is a series of independent Bernoulli trials − where each trial results in
a success (logic '1') or fail (logic '0'). The Binomial theorem expressed in Equation 2.4
accounts for non-unique signatures, as in 0110 is treated the same as 0101 due to number
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of successes. The Binomial coeﬃcient
(
n
k
)
is removed to account for unique signatures.
Figure 2.5 portrays the unique probable outcomes of a signature for length λ = 8 versus the
number of successes/logic '1's within the bit-stream. In the left Figure 2.5a, all signatures
are equally probable whereas Figure 2.5b shows signatures with more logic '1's than '0's
are more likely, detrimental to distinctness probability. The conventional approach used
in the birthday problem utilizing a sum of remaining probable outcomes in Equation 2.1
will not be useful in this case since conditional probabilities arise.
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Figure 2.5: Binomial Distribution − Unique Probable Outcomes of 8-bit Signature
P (n, k, p) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (2.4)
Where the binomial coeﬃcient n choose k is mathematically expressed as:
(
n
k
)
=
n!
k!(n− k)!
An initial base model can be derived based on Bernoulli trials to tackle the problem of
non-uniform distributions. Given 2 PUF bit-streams:
 Find the probability that pi is equal for PUF1 and PUF2 in position i. There are
two cases, the ith bit in both PUFs is a 1, probability p2, or a 0, probability (1− p)2,
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respectively. Adding these two probabilities and iterating through all λ bits (raising
to the power of λ) yields probability of PUF1 and PUF2 being equal.
 Subtract 1 from this probability to get the probability that these 2 PUFs are distinct.
PUF 1: 010 . . . 101
PUF 2: 100 . . . 001
PEqual = [p
2 + (1− p)2]λ
PDistinct = 1− PEqual = 1− [p2 + (1− p)2]λ
(2.5)
2.2 SRAM based PUFs
Static random access memory (static RAM or SRAM) is a type of semiconductor memory
used in integrated circuits for a wide range of computing systems including mobile devices
and enterprise servers. It's smallest functional unit, the bit-cell, is solely responsible for
storing a single bit of information, a logic '0' or '1'. It is classiﬁed as volatile, where data
is lost in absence of the supply voltage. A variety of topologies exist such as 6T and 8T,
which represent the number of transistors to construct a functional bit-cell. In this thesis,
the concept of a SRAM based PUF is demonstrated by the 6T SRAM bit-cell topology.
2.2.1 Bit-cell Architecture
Every 6T SRAM bit-cell is comprised of a fundamental storage element which is realized
through CMOS technology using back-to-back inverters as illustrated in 2.6a. Surrounding
this core are access devices as NMOS transistors and peripheral circuitry pertinent for
read/write operations. In the low level schematic in Figure 2.6b, transistors M1 and M2,
M3 and M4 form the back-to-back inverters, respectively. Transistors M1 and M3 are
referred to herein as drivers, and M2 and M4 are referred to herein as loads. In this work,
we focus on understanding the behaviour of SRAM bit-cells in the case of power-on.
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Figure 2.6: Schematic − SRAM Bit-cell [6T]
2.2.2 Bit-cell Start-up Behaviour
A bit-cell exhibits the behaviour of a bistable system portrayed in Figure 2.7. Ideally, a bit-
cell should store a stable state upon power-up with equal probable outcomes (≈ 50% 0 or 1)
from a metastable state as per illustrated in Figure 2.7a. However, process variation during
fabrication leads to a potential mismatch in the storage element causing a predisposition
to power on to a preferred cell state, for e.g. ≈ 71%% a logic '0' and ≈ 29%% a logic '1'.
Figure 2.7b along with Figure 2.7c demonstrates this biased behaviour in a bistable system.
A unique signature in the form of a bit-stream can be produced by collecting the SUVs of
an uninitialized block or data word(s) of SRAM for a multitude of applications. Addressed
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by Kumar et. al [15], it is common for FPGA products to perform a fresh initialization
sequence which involves a hard reset clearing all SRAM bit-cells to a logic '0', eﬀectively
destroying the random SUVs.
 0  1 
Metastable
(a) Balanced
 0  1 
(b) Logic ′0′ Friendly
 0  1 
(c) Logic ′1′ Friendly
Figure 2.7: Bistable System Nomenclature
Process variation and inherent device mismatches is becoming a predominant issue
as technology nodes are scaled down [16]. The mismatch in threshold voltages of the
driver transistors dominates the start-up behavior [4]. Figure 2.8 shows the bit-cell's SUV
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behavior when driver M3 has a lower threshold voltage in comparison to driver M1 with
a supply voltage VDD applied. In a switch-based model, M3 turns on earlier in relation to
M1 and the node Q is pulled down to a logic '0'. With the additional load devices M2 and
M4, regenerative feedback from the back-to-back inverters [4] stabilizes Q to a ′1′.
+ΔVt -ΔVt
 0  1 
VDD
Q Q
BL BL
M4M2
M1 M3
WL
M5 M6
Figure 2.8: Bit-cell start-up behavior due to Vt mismatch
Electrical characteristics of SRAM bit-cells are shown in Figure 2.9. The transient
response in Figure 2.9a illustrates small signal behaviour in both cases of drive strength
mismatches between M1 and M3. In the voltage transfer characteristic (VTC) presented
in Figure 2.9b, an ideal bit-cell based on a balanced set of back-to-back inverters begins
oﬀ at the voltage level VDD
2
. Any small oﬀset induced by mismatches is ampliﬁed and one
of the two stable states is reached randomly.
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Figure 2.9: SRAM Bit-cell − Power-on Characteristic
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2.2.3 Bit-cell Types
An SRAM bit-cell can be categorized under one of three types as outlined in Table 2.3.
Fully-skewed cells are desired for PUF applications due to their ability to produce consistent
reliable responses [17]. The symbols pi and qi = (1− pi) refer to the probable outcomes of
bit-cell i having logic '0' and '1' SUVs, respectively.
Bit-cell Type Description
Non-skewed
Process variation on each half of the bit-cell
cancel or nullify each other
pi = 0.5
Partially-skewed
Process variation causes moderate Vt mis-
match, leading to a stronger driver transistor
on one half of the bit-cell
0 < pi < 1, pi 6= 0.5
Fully-skewed
Process variation causes large Vt mismatch,
leading to an always preferred SUV
pi = {0, 1}
Table 2.3: SRAM Bit-cell Classiﬁcation
2.3 Characterization
This section provides an overview of well-known quality metrics in the literature that
demonstrate PUF performance. In subsequent equations, ai,j,k refers to the ith bit of the
jth word of the kth sample in PUF space a. The word size or length is λ bits, there are N
words in the space, and L = λ∗N total bits in the space. The SUVs are sampled K times.
A "PUF challenge" refers to an input bit-stream.
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2.3.1 Reliability
This parameter is a measure of the reproducibility of the PUF. Multiple queries of the
PUF with the same challenge should consistently produce the same bit-stream response.
Unreliable responses (bit ﬂips) can be tolerated by applying error correcting codes (ECC)
which are stored in NVM, however introducing area and design overhead. A parameter
used to characterize reliability is the fractional intra-hamming distance, fHD−Intra, which is
the number of bitwise diﬀerences between PUF responses to the same challenge normalized
to the total bit-stream length M. Equation 2.6 expresses this relationship. Summing the
number of bit-wise diﬀerences between samples k1 and k2 and normalizing with respect to
L total bits yields a measure of reliability. A reference vector/golden copy such as the ﬁrst
response and successive responses are compared. An ideal PUF has fHD−Intra = 0 for all
pairs of samples.
fHD−Intra(k1, k2) =
1
L
N−1∑
j=0
λ−1∑
i=0
XOR(ai,j,k1 , ai,j,k2)|k1 6=k2 (2.6)
2.3.2 Randomness
This parameter characterizes the uniqueness between two PUFs. There should be no corre-
lation between bit-stream responses and they are independently random. In a given PUF
instance, diﬀerent challenges, should not produce correlated responses. The statistical pa-
rameter to express randomness is fractional inter-hamming distance (within-die fHD−Inter
%). Captured in Equation 2.7, it states the number of bitwise diﬀerences between two
diﬀerent PUF responses, for words j1 and j2 within a particular sample k0. Pairs of two
responses in a PUF instance are compared. Ideally, a purely random PUF response is
uncorrelated with all other PUF responses, hence the ideal fHD−Inter = 0.5.
fHD−Inter(j1, j2, k0) =
1
λ
λ−1∑
i=0
XOR(ai,j1,k0 , ai,j2,k0)|j1 6=j2 (2.7)
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2.3.3 Symmetry
This parameter is concerned with the expected value of the entire SRAM PUF space.
Ideally, half of the total SUVs are logic '0' and the other half are logic '1' on a single power-
on. Otherwise, any systematic skew demonstrates biasing and develops an asymmetry
thereby reducing the entropy of the PUF. For an SRAM PUF, the expected value is the
mean, µ. Equation 2.8 shows the mean value for sample k0. A purely uniform SRAM PUF
has µ = 0.5, meaning equal probabilistic outcomes of logic '0' or '1' SUVs.
µ(k0) =
1
L
N−1∑
j=0
λ−1∑
i=0
ai,j,k0 (2.8)
2.3.4 Stability
This parameter characterizes the stability of bit-cells within the SRAM space. Ideally, the
SUVs are perfectly repeatable with all cells being fully-skewed towards '0' or '1'. Realisti-
cally, non- or partially-skewed bit-cells exist and tend to toggle their SUV response between
a logic '0' and '1', vice-versa. These bit-cells exhibit random SUVs and can be disregarded
from the PUF, but can still be used in hardware random number generation. The SUV
probability of bit i in word j, pi,j, can be determined with any given level of accuracy by
taking a suﬃciently large number of SUV samples, K, to deem whether a bit-cell be stable
or not, which is assumed in Equation 2.9. Hence, a bit-cell that is for example nearly a
strong '0' pi = or '1'. Ideally, pi,j = 1 or 0, however non- or partially-skewed bit-cells
will have intermediate probabilities. Moreover, the elimination process of these unstable
bit-cells is inﬂuenced by the allowable error margin of the ECC hardware.
Unstable bit-cells in the SUV patterns can be exposed visually. Heatmaps are drawn in
reference to a colour intensity scale to illustrate the various normalized bit-cell count values
within the pi = {0, 1} spectrum. An ideal bitmap shows a random digital ﬁngerprint with
no row- or column-wise correlations. Black and white heatmaps will be illustrated for one
data capture and coloured heatmaps will be used for more than one data capture. Figure
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2.10 illustrates a bitmap with an ideal random response of a SRAM PUF with a grey-scale
intensity expressing bit-cell probable outcome values.
pi,j =
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ai,j,k (2.9)
Figure 2.10: Bitmap − Ideal Response of SRAM PUF [18]
2.4 Silicon based PUFs
This section provides a literature review of silicon-based PUFs, derived from intricate pro-
cess variation present in the IC fabrication processes. Sources of variability at the semi-
conductor level in modern CMOS technology include sub-wavelength lithography, layout-
dependent transistor performance such as induced compressive stress and random dopant
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ﬂuctuations (RDF) [18]. Based on their principle of operation, silicon based-PUFs are
classiﬁed as follows:
 Delay: Using variation of interconnects in a circuit with numerous signal paths.
 Memory: Using device parameter mismatches in bi-stable memory storage elements.
Hereafter, existing implementations of silicon-based PUFs are discussed.
2.4.1 Delay based PUFs
Arbiter PUF
Lee et. al [19] proposed the ﬁrst silicon-based PUF, the arbiter PUF. It consists of two
parallel identical chains of 2 − to − 1 multiplexers ending with an arbiter, a fair decision
making device implemented as a SR latch recommended by Lin et. al [20] due to it's
symmetrical construction. Referring to Figure 2.11, a clock edge signal transition enters
the chain travelling through two unique paths and experiences propagation delay. The
arbiter outputs a logic '0' or '1' response accordingly based on the race of gate delays,
whether the ﬁrst or second input sees the incoming clock transition signal. The challenge
to this PUF system controls the select lines of the multiplexers and creates straight or
crossed connections to produce CRPs. In order to exploit process variation for creating
unique responses to input challenges, this necessitates the delay paths to be unbiased and
perfectly symmetrical.
In the unlikely scenario of both delay paths being exactly identical for a certain input
challenge, the clock transition appears at both inputs of the arbiter. The latch implementa-
tion of the arbiter will shift into a metastable state and eventually settle to an unpredictable
random state based on external noise inﬂuences. This unreliability is the major drawback
of arbiter PUFs. Another well known delay based PUF in the literature is the ring os-
cillator (RO) PUF. A chain of an odd number of inverter stages is used to implement a
RO. The most common purpose of a RO is to synthesize a square waveform that serves
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as a clock signal in IC systems. Providing an input challenge to a number of oscillator
pairs compares synthesized frequencies and thereby exposes any deviations manifested by
process variation. Complex conﬁgurable RO PUFs designed by Maiti and Schaumont [21]
improves reliability and randomness demonstrating progress in this PUF primitive.
D
E
latch
Q
0 Response
arbiter
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
Challenge
0 1 0 1
Figure 2.11: Schematic − Arbiter PUF
Glitch PUF
In a glitch PUF topology, Suzuki et. al [22] demonstrates that there is a non-linear cor-
relation between glitch waveforms discovered in combinatorial circuits and path delays for
input transitions. Whereas for arbiter PUFs, one can identify a linear correlation between
the CRPs and path delays in the multiplexer chain [23]. In a combinatorial circuit, the
time diﬀerence between output changes caused by a set of input transitions (challenges)
can arise in intermediary unstable states at the ouput (bit-stream responses). Properties
of a glitch such as occurrence and waveform shape is dictated by deviations in logical gate
delay paths. As proposed in [23], the glitch PUF operation can be abstracted as follows:
 Data input transitions to a combinatorial logic circuit.
 Discovery and acquisition of glitch waveforms at the output.
 Convert glitches into response bits using hashing techniques. For e.g., perform mod-
ulo operations on the number of positive edges discovered in the glitch.
The timing diagram of a basic combinatorial block is illustrated with a XOR and AND
logic gate in Figure 2.12. In the ﬁrst set of inputs on the left, during the time between X1
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andX2 both transitioning from low to high,X3 is active beforehand and hence at the output
of the XOR gate is logic '1' and hence the output is momentarily Y = 1 depicting a glitch.
On the right side with the second set of inputs, X3 is asserted during signal transitions
of X1 and X2, however this may not produce a glitch. In the work presented by Shimizu
et. al [24], an AES S-Box is used as an complex combinatorial logic block connected to a
toggle ﬂip-ﬂop which performs even parity against the glitch count. Elegant pre-processing
bit-masking techniques are used to alleviate unreliable bit-cells. As a result, a reliability
of 98.7% and a randomness of 35% is reported amongst 16 FPGA boards.
X1
X2
X3
Y
X1
X2
X3
Y
X1
X2
X3
Y
Figure 2.12: Schematic − Glitch PUF
2.4.2 Memory based PUFs
Latch PUF
The principle of operation for a latch PUF is the same as an SRAM-based PUF. Nom-
inally matched cross-coupled or back-to-back devices exhibit random mismatches caused
by process variation. In Figure 2.13, the 2 cross-coupled NOR logic gates form a SR latch.
Upon power-on with the input challenge RST pulled to a logic '1', the output response of
the PUF is stable. Once the RST signal is released or pulled down to logic '0', the output
response shifts to a metastable state and eventually converges to a stable state, logic '0' or
'1' governed by device parameter mismatches. In the proposed latch PUF implementation
by Su et. al [25] using NOR gates at the 130nm node, measurements across 19-die show
96.96 % reliability, and randomness of 50.55 %.
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Figure 2.13: Schematic − Latch PUF
Butterﬂy PUF
Referring to Figure 2.14, the butterﬂy PUF utilizes two cross-coupled latches to retrieve an
output response. Initially, the CLR/Clear signal of latch 1 and the PRE/Preset of latch
2 is driven by the input signal Excite causing the output response to fall into an unstable
state. Once released, the output response oscillates and converges to a stable state based
on physical parameter mismatches between the latches and wire interconnects. This PUF
can be evaluated during power-on − unlike SRAM PUFs.
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Q
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CLR
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Figure 2.14: Schematic − Butterﬂy PUF
2.5 Applications
Commonly known useful applications of PUFs in the literature are provided in this section.
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2.5.1 Secret Key Generation
Secure data transmission requires encryption of a secret key over public communication
channels. Existing secure key generation is accomplished through complex TRNG hard-
ware embedded in devices and stored in NVM − susceptible to physical or side-channel
attacks. Motivated by [26], memoryless secret key storage is a use case of PUFs. Encryp-
tion algorithms such as Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) advocate a minimum key length of 3072 bits and 128, respectively [27].
In the work presented by Dodis et al. [28], and Suh and Devadas [29], a method is
proposed to generate cryptographic keys. In Figure 2.15, a key generation process utiliz-
ing PUFs is illustrated. In the initialization stage, the PUF response undergoes ECC to
alleviate any noisy responses caused by environment ﬂuctuations. The ECC encoded bits
or termed as helper data is stored in NVM or in a public database to recognize bit-ﬂips in
future PUF responses. In the regeneration stage, the key is generated using a combina-
tion of the PUF response, helper data and additional hashing techniques. Integrity of the
generated key is not compromised by the publically available helper data [26].
NVM
Initialization
Phase
Re-generation
Phase
PUF
ECC
[Helper Data]
PUF
ECC
[Helper Data]
Hash
Function
Cryptographic Key Generation
Secret 
Key
Challenge Response
Figure 2.15: Application − Cryptographic Key Generation
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2.5.2 Device Authentication
The unique output response a PUF generates is exploited for device identiﬁcation and
authentication. This application is divided into two steps − enrolment and veriﬁcation.
Referring to Figure 2.16, upon manufacturing the IC, an authentication authority enrols
many, if not all, CRPs of the PUF primitive in a secure remote database. In order to verify
the authenticity of the IC when it is active in the consumer market, a randomly chosen
set of challenges from the database is presented to the PUF and if the generated responses
and the corresponding responses match within an error tolerance described by a speciﬁca-
tion, then the PUF is successfully veriﬁed and authentic. In malicious physical attacks or
attempting to clone PUFs, an error response should be encoded in addition to the PUF
response authentication scheme from the perspective of the remote database. Platonov's
thesis provides statistical analysis of SUVs of ten Atmel ATmega1284P MCUs [30] with
proposed PUF designs for identiﬁcation and key generation, results are summarized in the
comparison section of Chapter 4.3.1.
Secure Cloud Database
Challenge-Response Pairs
(CRPs)
ENROLMENT
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PUF Device
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Response_iChallenge_i
Challenge_1 Response_1
Challenge_2
Challenge_3
 
Response_2
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VERIFICATION
PHASE
PUF Device
[In-field]
Response_j
[Generated]
Challenge_i
[Selected]
Response_i
[Corresponding]
AUTHENTIC =
(Resp_i == Resp_j) ?
TRUE : FALSE;
Figure 2.16: Application − Device Authentication
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2.5.3 True Hardware Random Number Generation
A true hardware random number generator takes advantage of the non-skewed bit-cells
in SRAM PUFs. Instead of discarding these unreliable bit-cells in the context of key
generation, they can be concatenated to form a random number within a range speciﬁed
by the incoming request. The overhead to identify non-skewed bit-cells can be costly based
on SRAM size and a lengthy iterative power cycling process.
Figure 2.17 illustrates a small byte-addressable portion of a SRAM with an arbitrarily
chosen starting address in hex and normalized probable bit-cell outcome SUVs for 100
power cycling iterations. Four non-skewed bit-cells are highlighted in yellow, p = 0.5 ±
C, where C is a constant adhering to a speciﬁc security requirement by the governing
body Federal Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) [31]. Generated values for a 4-
bit unsigned or signed integer range from [0, (24 − 1)] or from [−7, 8], inclusively and
respectively. In Herrewege's PhD thesis, a lightweight PUF based TRNG is implemented
using the ARM Cortex-M0 MCU [32].
For a truly random seed, maximum entropy is needed hence the random number bit
generator must have a probable outcome of p = 0.5, hence C = 0. In the case of C 6= 0, the
random bits are considered pseudo-random and the seed output is deterministic, even after
applying it through a hash function. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) provides a set of comprehensive randomness tests to qualify TRNG. In the work
presented by [31], the SHA-256 hash function is a suggested hash function that compresses
input strings of multiples of 512 bits into an output of 256 bits. This hashing algorithm
requires an input entropy of 256 truly random seed bits for it's output to have full entropy.
Further conditioning algorithms utilize the output of the SHA-256 hash function in a
random number generation procedure.
31
0 0.01 0.89 0.97 1 0.47 0 1
0.51
0
0.96
1 1 0 0.03 0 0.78 0.99
0 0.48 1 0.96 0.15 0.89 0
0 1 0.92 0 0.98 1 0.52
4-bit Wide Random Number
Unsigned Integer  [0  24 - 1]
Signed Integer  [-7  8]
0x40040000
0x40040001
0x40040002
0x40040003
Figure 2.17: Application − True Random Number Generation
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Chapter 3
Characterization Framework
In this section, an overview of the experimental setup is provided along with practical
applications of SRAM based PUFs. Figure 3.1 depicts the principle of operation of an
SRAM-based PUF. Memory information is provided as follows:
 Conventional byte-addressable direct mapped matrix with N rows by M columns.
 Word size: 4 bytes = 32 bits
 Block size (row) = 4 words = 16 bytes = 128 bits
 Peripheral decoding circuitry for reading/writing operations.
 Knowledge of organization such as word interleaving, or parity is unknown. Em-
bedded SRAM is treated as a black box DUT for PUF characterization and proﬁling.
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Figure 3.1: SRAM Architectural Organization
3.1 Commercial oﬀ-the-shelf Products
The commercial oﬀ-the-shelf products of interest are:
 Microcontrollers:
 STM32F429ZIT6U
 ATSAMR21G18A
3.1.1 Microcontrollers
MCUs contain a processor core, programmable input/output (I/O) peripherals, NVM for
code storage and limited volatile memory typically in the form of SRAM. Majority of MCUs
do not implement high performance memory architectural improvements such as hierarchy
with caching mechanisms and cache coherency protocls. This allows eﬃcient extraction of
PUF responses from SUVs in the available limited SRAM due to non-intervened SRAM
bit-cell content. Whereas, other programmable COTS products such as FPGAs pose diﬃ-
culties to extract PUF responses due to internal resets which results in the loss of random
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SUVs. Wild et. al suggest strategies using power gating and partial reconﬁguration of
bit-streams in FPGA development boards to extract uninitialized SRAM SUVs [33].
The COTS investigated are prototyping development boards made by silicon vendors
STMElectronics and Atmel. At the core of each embedded system is an ARM Cortex-
based MCU based on STM32F4 and ATSAMR21 MCU product families, respectively.
They contain embedded SRAM for data storage during program execution. Table 3.1
entails product information and SRAM organization.
Table 3.1: Embedded Development Boards − Product Information
MCU #1 #2
Manufacturer STMElectronics Atmel
Product [Board] STM32F429I-DISCOVERY ATSAMR21-XPRO
Product [MCU] STM32F429ZIT6U ATSAMR21G18A
Architecture ARM Cortex−M4 180 MHz ARM Cortex−M0+ 48 MHz
Operating Voltage 1.7 - 3.6 V 1.8 - 3.6 V
SRAM Size(s)
Total: 192 KB
Total: 32 KB
SRAM1: 112 KB
0x2000000⇔ 0x2001BFFF
SRAM2: 16 KB
0x2001C000⇔ 0x2001FFFF
SRAM3: 64 KB 0x20020000⇔ 0x20008000
0x20020000⇔ 0x2002FFFF
3.2 Power Cycling Experiment
The experimental framework consisted of an automated and manual data acquisition strat-
egy. Both MCU development boards received power from a 5 V USB supply voltage, sup-
plied from a host computer. The automated strategy uses a USB programmable data relay
to collect large data sets in a productive manner. The manual strategy required physical
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removal of the USB interface to power cycle each target board. This mimics the use case
of in-ﬁeld battery removal or transient operation of embedded devices.
3.2.1 Automated
A power cycling experiment, illustrated in Figure 3.2 was devised to characterize SUVs
of both MCUs under a single nominal power supply condition. The embedded SRAM
instance within each MCU is considered to be a black-box DUT.
Referring to Appendix A, the host machine used an automation script to perform power
cycling and data transfer of SRAM SUVs. During power-on for ﬁve seconds, a supply
voltage of VDD−Board = 3.3V , derived from the USB line, VDD−USB = 5.0V and passing
through the USB-controlled data relay, was applied to each DUT. Proprietary embedded
debug software tools [34, 35] on the host machine initiated sequential SRAM reads, and
data was transferred as a binary ﬁle (.bin). Power-oﬀ was for two seconds, during which
time the SRAM bit-cells discharge. The power cycling repeated until the collected data
set reaches K = 10, 000 total captures.
USB
MCU FPGADATA
External IC
Figure 3.2: Power Cycling Experiment − Automated Setup
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3.2.2 Manual
In this strategy, only the ATSAM MCU was tested to determine the beneﬁt of performing
a manual power cycling strategy. Illustrated in Figure 3.3, a console application must be
open on the host machine and successfully connected to the target MCU via a COMPORT
interface. In an integrated development environment, a C program is loaded onto ﬂash
memory to access and print embedded SRAM SUVs which in turn is visible on the console.
Full implementation details with comments is entailed in Appendix B. This versatile API
in C has been developed to facilitate access of embedded SRAM. The function prototypes,
description and arguments are entailed in Table 3.2.
USB
DATA
GND
VDD
MCU FPGA
External IC
Figure 3.3: Power Cycling Experiment − Manual Setup
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Table 3.2: API − Embedded SRAM Access for PUFs
Description
Arguments
Inputs Outputs
readEmbeddedSRAM:
Read SRAM contents and
print byte data to terminal
(char ∗) inc_mem_start None
int inc_num_bytes
getPUFWord: Return
32-bit PUF data word at
given address
(char ∗) inc_mem_start long puf_word
getPUFLongWord:
Return 128-bit PUF data
word at given address
(char ∗) inc_mem_start long puf_long_word
A suggested approach for implementing this API is shown in Figure 3.4. The PUF API
can be integrated into the bootloader sequence at the beginning of ﬂash memory, while the
remainder is occupied by user program code. Both MCU #1 and #2 allocate the SRAM
memory from the start address for stack and heap usage. The SUVs derived from source
bits near the end of the SRAM address space can be utilized as PUFs.
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User
Program
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SRAM
Source Bits
NVM: Flash VM: SRAM
Configuration
Program Code
Stack or Heap 
Memory
SRAM PUF
Figure 3.4: Microcontroller Memory Layout
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Chapter 4
Measurement Results and Comparative
Analysis
A comparative analysis between the measurement results gathered from the STM and
ATSAMMCUs for both power cycling experiments is provided. The automated experiment
completed under 25 hours for K = 10, 000 samples or power cycles in an environment with
an ambient temperature of 24.0 °C.
4.1 Automated
4.1.1 Reliability
The sole purpose of the automated experiment is to collect a large data set of SRAM SUVs
to perform statistical analysis. The SUVs were evaluated to determine their reproducibility
over K = 10, 000 power cycles in comparison to the ﬁrst captured sample. Referring to
Figure 4.1, MCU #1 and #2 have calculated mean intra-hamming distances of fHD−Intra =
5.80 % and 4.38 %, respectively. The spikes around samples 5800, 8800 and 9400 can be
potentially attributed to temperature variations and tampering of the USB cables during
data acquisition. As outlined in [36, 37], PUF reliability can be improved by applying
40
repetition ECC using XOR logic and storing correction bits in NVM to reduce bit ﬂips.
MCU #2 performs better with respect to reliability.
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Figure 4.1: PUF Reliability − Fractional Intra-Hamming Distance [Automated] fHD−Intra
In Figure 4.2, the number of errors per 128-bit data item are investigated. Surprisingly,
despite the lower fHD−Intra of MCU #2, particular 128-bit data words are subject to many
bit ﬂips with a maximum fHD−Intra ≈ 29.69 % implying that about 38 bits are unreliable.
Whereas, for MCU #1, the maximum approaches fHD−Intra ≈ 17.19 %, which is about
22 bits ﬂipped. However, on average, fHD−Intra for MCU #2 is about 1.223% lower than
MCU #1, 4.155 % as opposed to 5.483 %, respectively. The standard deviation on the
maximum errors per 128-bit data word for MCU #2 is considerably larger than MCU #1,
as entailed in Table 4.1. This is important information that dictates the design complexity
for resilient ECC circuitry.
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Figure 4.2: PUF Reliability − Errors per 128-bit Data Item [Automated]
Table 4.1: Summary − Errors per 128-bit Data Item [Automated | K = 100]
MCU
Mean
(%)
Max
(%)
STD
(%)
#1 14.675 17.19 0.7798
#2 15.428 29.69 6.2690
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4.1.2 Randomness
In this analysis, the PUF primitive was 128 bit data items, four aligned 32-bit words. All
combinations of two distinct PUFs in the total memory space for a given sample underwent
a bit-wise comparison to yield an average fractional inter-hamming distance. Referring to
4.3, MCU #1 and MCU #2 have a calculated mean within-die inter-hamming distance of
fHD−Inter = 49.02% and 49.67%, respectively. With respect to randomness and correlation
between bit-cells in each PUF, MCU #2 marginally outperforms MCU #1.
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4.1.3 Symmetry
In this analysis, the mean value of SUVs captured from one power on event was calculated.
In each embedded SRAM, the PUF included the entire bit-cell population. Referring to
Figure 4.4, MCU #1 has a near even distribution of SUVs with µ = 0.5001. MCU #2 has
µ = 0.5474, the latter result means that constructed PUFs utilizing these bit-cells will have
a slight bias towards logic '1', reducing PUF entropy. A summary is provided in Table 4.2
which expresses these values as percentages of '0's and '1's.
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Figure 4.4: PUF Uniformity − SUV Distribution [Automated]
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Table 4.2: PUF Uniformity − SUV Distribution [Automated]
MCU
SUV
Response
Fractional bit-cell
Quantity (%)
#1
'0' 49.99
'1' 50.01
#2
'0' 45.26
'1' 54.74
4.1.4 Stability
This analysis identiﬁes unstable bit-cells using a counting technique. The sum of all 10, 000
SUV samples of each unique bit-cell is calculated. If the resultant value is 0 or 10, 000, then
this signiﬁes a strong '0' or strong '1', respectively. The remaining bit-cells hold values
between 0 and 10, 000 implying that the bit-cell SUV was erroneously '0' or '1' at least
once. These bit-cells are therefore non- or partially-skewed and are not suitable for use in a
PUF. Figure 4.5 shows that 36.86% and 28.86% of the total bit-cell count of MCU #1 and
#2, respectively, are non- or partially-skewed. As the number of successive SUV captures
increases, the number of unstable bit-cells approaches a threshold, illustrating asymptotic
behaviour. The chosen number of samples 10, 000 was inﬂuenced by experiment runtime in
the proposed setup. Due to the linear relationship between number of samples taken and
experimental runtime, if 100, 000 samples were taken, the expected experimental runtime
would be ≈ 250 hours. Certainly, a larger number of captures increases the conﬁdence that
a bit-cell is stable and improves the qualiﬁcation process. Further, other work entailed in
Table 4.7 perform experiments that capture a similar scale of data samples in the thousands.
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Figure 4.5: PUF Stability Unstable Bit-cells Distribution
4.1.5 Summary
In Table 4.3, reliability and randomness quality parameters are summarized. In both
aspects, MCU #2 performs comparatively better and is a more suitable PUF.
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Table 4.3: Summary − Reliability & Randomness [Automated | K = 10, 000]
Metric MCU
Mean
(%)
STD
(%)
Max
(%)
Min
(%)
Intra-HD
#1 5.8 0.107 7.1 5.25
#2 4.38 0.107 4.93 4.02
Inter-HD
#1 49.02 0.359 50.3 47.88
#2 49.67 0.172 50.23 49.09
4.2 Manual
The manual experiment involved physical removal of the USB interface to power cycle MCU
#2. This conveys in-ﬁeld battery removal or transient operation use cases for embedded
devices housing a MCU. The goal here is to manually collect a small data set of K = 10
data captures and observe similar trends in comparison to analysis performed with the
automated data set for MCU #2.
4.2.1 Reliability
The reliability plot showcased in Figure 4.6 has an average fHD−Intra = 4.89%. Recalling
Equation 2.6, calculating the reliability via fHD−Intra requires a particular reference sample
to be chosen (k1). Results infer fHD−Intra is not heavily inﬂuenced by diﬀerent references.
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Figure 4.6: PUF Reliability Fractional Intra-Hamming Distance [Manual] fHD−Intra
Table 4.4 shows a ≈ 0.5% increase on average in fHD−Intra for the manual experiment
in comparison to the automated experiment. This may be attributed to the physical
maneuvering of the USB cable during power cycling.
4.2.2 Randomness
The randomness plot showcased in Figure 4.7 has an average fHD−Inter = 52.25%. This is
an increase of 1.92% over the automated experiment. This is due to the pre-initialized to 0
bit-cells allocated for stack and heap memory for storing temporary data during instruction
execution. Summary of fHD−Intra and fHD−Inter results are shown in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.4: Reliability − MCU #2 with varying References [Manual | K = 10]
Metric Experiment
Mean
(%)
STD
(%)
Max
(%)
Min
(%)
fHD−Intra
Automated
[k1 : 1st]
4.36 0.140 4.42 4.09
Manual
[k1 : 1st]
4.89 0.208 5.18 4.41
Manual
[k1 : 3rd]
4.83 0.060 4.92 4.71
Manual
[k1 : 7th]
4.88 0.147 5.18 4.73
Manual
[k1 : 10th]
4.91 0.105 5.09 4.71
4.2.3 Symmetry
A mean value of µ = 52.72 as shown in Table 4.5, indicates a skew towards a SUV of
logic '1'. This outperforms the automated experiment by a value of 2.02%. However, the
allocated portion of SRAM is cleared for stack or heap memory for program code.
Table 4.5: Summary − PUF Uniformity − SUV Distribution [Manual]
MCU
SUV
Response
Fractional bit-cell
Quantity (%)
#2
'0' 47.28
'1' 52.72
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Figure 4.7: PUF Randomness Fractional Inter-Hamming Distance [Manual] fHD−Inter
4.2.4 Stability
The sum of all 10 SUV samples of each unique bit-cell is calculated. Bit-ﬂips from logic '0'
to logic '1' or vice-versa indicate an unstable bit-cell. Figure 4.8 shows 13.30% of the total
bit-cell count of ATSAM MCUs are non- or partially-skewed. A similar trend is observed
in the automated experiment, with the exception that reserved bit-cells at the beginning of
the SRAM space are wiped to 0, they are discarded from the unstable bit-cell distribution.
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Figure 4.8: PUF Stability Unstable Bit-cells Distribution [Manual]
4.2.5 Summary
Reliability and randomness metrics are summarized for the manual experiment in Table
4.6. Automated power cycling is recommended during the characterization of SRAM PUFs.
Table 4.6: Summary − Reliability & Randomness for MCU #2 [Manual | K = 10]
Metric
Mean
(%)
STD
(%)
Max
(%)
Min
(%)
Intra-HD 4.89 0.208 5.18 4.41
Inter-HD 52.25 0.063 52.37 52.17
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4.3 Proﬁles
In this section, SRAM heat-maps are drawn to illustrate bit-cell stability, based on the
data set acquired through the automated experiment. Grey and colour scales are used
for one data capture, and more than one data capture, respectively using Matplotlib 2D
graphics library [38]. Intensity ranges from {0, 1} in which pi maps to based on normalized
bit-cell count values to total number of samples. The start and endpoints of the colour bar
indicate a strong '0' or '1' with intermediary values as unstable bits.
Illustrated by streaking patterns in Figure 4.9 and 4.10, the heatmap of MCU #1
exhibits column-wise correlation. Despite MCU #1's promising numerical results, quanti-
tative performance metrics cannot solely describe the quality of a PUF. One can speculate
that the physical organization of memory is word interleaved, where consecutive memory
addresses are allocated to each bank of memory. The translation scheme from logical to
physical addresses is unknown making it challenging to determine the root cause of this
pattern.
Referring to Figure 4.11 and 4.12, the bitmap of MCU #2 appears random. This
resembles an ideal bitmap previously shown in Figure 2.10 with high entropy SUVs.
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Figure 4.9: Memory Proﬁle Heatmap − MCU #1 [K = 1]
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Figure 4.10: Memory Proﬁle Heatmap − MCU #1 [K = 10, 000]
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Figure 4.11: Memory Proﬁle Heatmap − MCU #2 [K = 1]
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Figure 4.12: Memory Proﬁle Heatmap − MCU #2 [K = 10, 000]
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4.3.1 Comparison
In this section, MCU #2 is chosen to be compared against other works with regards to the
aforementioned quality parameters for various COTS microcontroller embedded SRAMs.
The automated data set statistical results are used. As outlined in Table 4.7, MCU #2
performs well in relation to the other MCUs, in particular a relatively low fHD−Intra and
close to ideal fHD−Inter. Whereas, the ATmega1284P in Platonov's thesis [30] has poor
fHD−Inter and the NXP LPC1768 has nearly twice as much fHD−Intra. Our MCU does
suﬀer from a bias towards logic '1', which is not evident in other works. The comparison
does not adhere to a standard experimental setup, as each work has a unique test-bed for
power cycling and data acquisition. Further, a varied number of MCUs are tested with
diﬀerent temperatures, SRAM sizes and number of captured samples.
Table 4.7: Summary − Comparison of Microcontroller Embedded SRAMs
This Work [5] [30] [36]
Year 2016 2015 2013 2011
Product ATSAMR21G18A STM32F3/F4 ATmega1284P NXP LPC1768
Chips Tested 1 67 10 3
SRAM (KB) 32 112 16 32
Temp (°C) 24 25 20 25
Samples 10, 000 2331 'Thousands' 1000
Intra-HD (%) 4.38 3.036 6.7 8
Inter-HD (%)
49.67 48.428 40 49.78
[within-die] [within-die] [die-to-die] [die-to-die]
Symmetry (µ) 0.5474 0.4955 0.73 0.5205
Instability (%) 28.86 N/A 39 N/A
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This section concludes the thesis with a summary, an overview of results and future work.
Motivated by the IoT and low-cost appeal of MCUs, this thesis' intent was to de-
termine the suitable PUF amongst two COTS Arm Cortex MCUs. The unclonability
property of PUFs is demonstrated with an analytical model. Evolution of PUFs and re-
lated background information regarding PUF types, SRAM bit-cells and characterization
are provided. An embedded SRAM characterization framework is developed and used in
an automated power cycling experiment to collect SUV data. A manual experiment is also
used for data acquisition and uses application code implemented in C. Statistical analysis
of SUV measurements describe PUF performance in accordance to quality parameters.
Results show that MCU #2 outperforms MCU #1 in reliability by 1.42 %, randomness
by 0.65 % and stability by 8.00 %, with a 4.74 % SUV bias towards a logic '1'. Max
errors per 128-bit data item is 22 and 38 bits for MCU #1 and MCU #2, respectively.
Heat-map of MCU #2 illustrates a random signature whereas MCU #1 shows column-wise
correlation. Comparative analysis shows that MCU #2 is the suitable PUF.
Future work involves expanding the qualiﬁcation process to incorporate advanced en-
tropy metrics, investigating die-to-die correlations, temperature sensitivity and various
power supply strategies. An investigation in the column-wise correlations of the STM
MCU is suggested.
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Appendix A
Power Cycling Automation Script
This batch script ran on a Windows host machine via command line. It interfaced with
debug software to perform sequential reads in embedded SRAM for both MCUs. Data
captures are in the form of binary ﬁles and a a USB controlled relay is used for power
cycling. Note that directories need to be modiﬁed accordingly to the respective ﬁle system.
@ECHO off
setlocal enabledelayedexpansion
::Clear console log
CLS
::Memory capture commands
::Atmel -> "C:\Users\Sakib\Documents\Atmel Studio\
6.2\edbg-master-working\edbg" -brf <file_name>
::ST -> "C:\Program Files (x86)\STMicroelectronics\STM32 ST-LINK Utility\
ST-LINK Utility\ST-LINK_CLI" -Dump 0x20000000 0x30000 <file_name>
SET utility_atmel="C:\Users\Sakib\Documents\Atmel Studio\
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6.2\edbg-master-working\edbg"
SET utility_st="C:\Program Files (x86)\STMicroelectronics
\STM32 ST-LINK Utility\ST-LINK Utility\ST-LINK_CLI"
SET utility_usb="C:\Program Files (x86)
\DenkoviRelayCommandLineTool\DenkoviRelayCommandLineTool_10.jar"
SET utility_usb_ser_num=DAE002dM
SET date=12_22
SET /a capture_total=10000
SET /a capture_number=1
SET folder_dest_atmel="../ATSAMR21G18A/captures_%date%_10000_samples_automated"
SET folder_dest_st="../STM32F429ZIT6U/captures_%date%_10000_samples_automated"
::Create ST directory if it doesn't already exist
IF EXIST %folder_dest_st% ECHO ST Directory already exists
IF NOT EXIST %folder_dest_st% MKDIR %folder_dest_st%
::Create Atmel directory if it doesn't already exist
IF EXIST %folder_dest_atmel% ECHO Atmel Directory already exists
IF NOT EXIST %folder_dest_atmel% MKDIR %folder_dest_atmel%
ECHO "Ensuring all individual relays are off"
java -jar %utility_usb% %utility_usb_ser_num% 4 turn 0000
ECHO ""
TIMEOUT 1
:LOOP
ECHO "Current Capture number is %capture_number%"
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SET file_name_atmel="%date%_MCU_ATSAMR21G18A_32KB_%capture_number%.bin"
SET file_name_st="%date%_MCU_STM32F429ZIT6U_192KB_%capture_number%.bin"
SET file_name_absolute_atmel="%folder_dest_atmel%/%file_name_atmel%"
SET file_name_absolute_st="%folder_dest_st%/%file_name_st%"
ECHO "Turning on 1st and 2nd relay - check status LEDs on board"
java -jar %utility_usb% %utility_usb_ser_num% 4 turn 1100
ECHO "Ensuring devices are fully on - PC recognition sound"
TIMEOUT 5
::Both Atmel & ST Devices should be recognized by PC via USB port
::ST SRAM Capture
ECHO ST MCU: Capturing and saving %file_name_absolute_st%
%utility_st% -Dump 0x20000000 0x30000 %file_name_absolute_st%
::Atmel SRAM Capture
ECHO Atmel MCU: Capturing and saving %file_name_absolute_atmel%
%utility_atmel% -brf %file_name_absolute_atmel%
TIMEOUT 1
java -jar %utility_usb% %utility_usb_ser_num% 4 turn 0000
TIMEOUT 1
IF EXIST %file_name_absolute_st% (
IF EXIST %file_name_absolute_atmel% (
SET /a capture_number=capture_number+1
)
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) ELSE (
ECHO "Error: Could not capture file %file_name_absolute_st%"
ECHO "Error: Could not capture file %file_name_absolute_atmel%"
)
IF %capture_number% LEQ %capture_total% GOTO loop
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Appendix B
Embedded SRAM Access API Code
void readEmbeddedSRAM(char * inc_mem_start, int inc_num_bytes) {
// Point to starting physical address of SRAM
char *mem_start = inc_mem_start;
// Specify number of bytes to be read
int num_bytes = inc_num_bytes;
// Bit-stream field initialization to zero
long puf_word = 0x00000000;
// Iterate through address space until all bytes read
for (int i = 0; i < inc_num_bytes; i = i + 4) {
puf_word = getPUFWord(mem_start, i);
// Print 32-bit PUF word to screen
printf("ADDRESS : DATA");
printf("%p : %x \n", (int*) (mem_start + i), puf);
}
}
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long getPUFWord(char * inc_mem_start, int inc_start_idx) {
// Construct 32-bit PUF using bit-shifting and
// concatenation of 1-byte (8-bit) data items
char puf_byte_one = inc_mem_start[inc_start_idx];
char puf_byte_two = inc_mem_start[inc_start_idx + 1];
char puf_byte_three = inc_mem_start[inc_start_idx + 2];
char puf_byte_four = inc_mem_start[inc_start_idx + 3];
long puf_word = (long) (puf_byte_four | (puf_byte_three << 8)
| (puf_byte_two << 16) | (puf_byte_one << 24));
return puf_word;
}
long * getPUFLongWord(char * inc_mem_start) {
// Acquire four separate 32-bit PUF words
long puf_word_one = getPUFWord(inc_mem_start);
long puf_word_two = getPUFWord(inc_mem_start + 4);
long puf_word_three = getPUFWord(inc_mem_start + 8);
long puf_word_four = getPUFWord(inc_mem_start + 12);
// Concatenate four 32-bit PUF words to
// construct a 128-bit PUF long word
long puf_long_word[4] = {puf_word_one, puf_word_two, puf_word_three,
puf_word_four};
// Aux: Printing purposes
printf("ADDRESS: %x => %x %x %x %x \r\n", mem_start, puf_long_word[0],
puf_long_word[1], puf_long_word[2], puf_long_word[3]);
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return puf_long_word;
}
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